As George Santayana stated, "Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it".
Which brings us to Afghanistan and the Canadian Forces fighting there today.
As a country, Afghanistan has been soaked in blood for centuries. From various Persian invaders to intertribal wars that lasted for decades, the difficult terrain and fractured tribal loyalties have made it easy to invade but difficult to hold. The British suffered a major defeat in the First Afghan War in 1842 (there were to be three) when a force of 14,000 was reduced to one survivor in the retreat from Kabul to Gandamak. The Second War was more successful for the British, who wisely limited their objectives; the Third resulted in an independent Afghanistan and continuing bloodshed from shifting regimes and intertribal warfare.
Then came the Russian Invasion on December 24th, 1979, leading to their subsequent defeat and - some would argue - the collapse of the USSR. Assisted by the ISI (Pakistani secret service) and Americans ("Charlie Wilson's War", a recently released movie, tracks the American efforts to arm the local tribes) the local Mujahideen forces forced the Soviets out in 1988. The United States funded and supplied the Mujahideen "freedom fighters" and thus created the "Islamofaschists" that are today the enemy in Bush’s "War on Terror". "Blowback", it is called.
Having "won" the war, Afghanistan was largely ignored by the USA. There was little aid and less concern. Having spent vast sums to arm the Afghanis (who kept those arms), no concern was given to rebuilding the war-torn country. Once again, tribal conflict emerged with warlords parsing out sections of the country as their fiefdoms relying upon the opium crops to finance their armies. That gave rise to the Taleban, who hosted the remnants of Mujahideen forces recruited from other Muslim countries, one such remnant being al-Qaida. The only sign of any interest at all from the West was the desire for a pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan, which saw Taleban dignitaries feted in Sugarland, Texas by Unocal. Oil and gas deals were concerns; human rights in Afghanistan were never mentioned.
The successful American attack on Afghanistan in 2001 - Enduring Freedom - relied primarily on arming and backing one of the local militias, the Northern Alliance. As in 1988, the Americans lost interest and shifted troops to Iraq and a new invasion. Defeat was snatched from the jaws of victory. Aid for reconstruction was limited to promises and words. The Taleban and al-Qaida retreated to lost valleys and northern Pakistan to wait. A few American troops and the "Coalition forces" (including Canadian troops) stayed behind to protect the new regime and "clear up the mess" in Afghanistan, but not in Pakistan where most of the Taleban were now in residence, safe and close by. Oh yes, we held an "election" that gave rise to great press but changed little.
Now, the Taleban has returned. A recent edition of the PBS program "FRONTLINE" detailed the resurgence of the Taleban from the tribal areas of Pakistan to the south of Afghanistan where Canadian forces are stationed. The program made no mention of the Canadian forces, referring only to American or "Coalition" soldiers. Pakistan is certainly not able to control its northern border and tribal area and its ISI has many ties with the Taleban. The efforts of the Pakistan military to control the tribes have met with failure and ended in accommodation.
Canada’s involvement came about under Prime Minister Chrétien as a direct result of 9/11. We wanted to be on the good team, for the USA and not against it in Bush’s terminology; the terrorists had to be punished. While almost all of the pilots and terrorists of that day were not Afghani but Saudi, Afghanistan had harboured al-Qaida and Ben Laden providing some justification for war. The Taleban, we were now told, was an extreme and repressive regime. But even now, years after we got involved and stayed, the objectives of this conflict for Canada are not at all clear. We have replaced the government with one more favoured (even if the Prime Minister is known more as the "Mayor of Kabul" for the limited area he actually controls). The warlords still control most of the country; the Coalition forces control where they are, from moment to moment.
The growing of opium continues and expands, funding the warlords and Taleban from their sales of product to our societies. On November 18th, 2004, CBC reported that opium production had surged in Afghanistan in the preceding year ("A new United Nations report says drug production has shot up more than 60 per cent in the past year") and it continues to grow, supplying 92% of the global supply. Opium represents one third of Afghanistan's gross domestic product. The street drug deals in Prince George are the last link in the chain that starts in Afghanistan. 2006 saw a further 49% increase according to the United Nations (http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=70511 ).
It is, quite simply, the same old story. We can get the occasional "feel good" tales of wells being dug and girls going to school but we are never going to "win" if winning means what most of us would consider control of the country and the establishment of normal human rights and rule of law - or a decrease in opium production. We will see a continual war between our forces and the resurgent Taleban (or tribes) who have no wish to change their ways or to accept a foreign occupation (which is how the locals view what is occuring, regardless of how we elect to view things). Kill a few and a even more come up from Pakistan. Our "allies" have no wish to see their troops moved from the safer north to the violent south. Germany has simply refused and there is no reason to think that any of the other Coalition members wish to loose their lives to assist Bush’s War on Terror.
Our departure is only a matter of time. When that departure comes - as it shall - nothing will have changed. A few wells might remain a few buildings perhaps. Still, the "old ways" will continue. With no clear goals remaining, no objectives that can be attained and the lessons of history, we should bring our troops home. Whatever point had to be made, it was made months and years ago. If – and that is a very large "if" – aid can be made to accomplish anything in Afghanistan, we should direct our efforts towards not military action but the rebuilding of what has been lost. Attempts to change the Afghani social structure will not work.
In 1817, the poet Shelly composed his short "Ozymandias":
"I met a traveller from an antique land
Who said: Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert. Near them on the sand,
Half sunk, a shatter'd visage lies, whose frown
And wrinkled lip and sneer of cold command
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamp'd on these lifeless things,
The hand that mock'd them and the heart that fed.
And on the pedestal these words appear:
"My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!"
Nothing beside remains: round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare,
The lone and level sands stretch far away."
In years to come, the efforts of our troops and our dead in Afghanistan shall be as Ozymandias’ statue. Nothing will remain and all will be as it was before the death and dying.
